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Tar adhesives, Neandertals, and the tyranny of the
discontinuous mind
Jo~ao Zilh~aoa,b,c,1
Were the builders of Stonehenge and the painters
of Altamira (Fig. 1) cognitively and behaviorally like
present-day humans? Did those prehistoric people have
language? In the absence of writing, these never-asked
questions cannot be answered with direct evidence.
However, we take it for granted that, yes, they were,
and they did. We do so because we instinctively know
that such works require the capacity for abstract
thought, deep foresight, and sophisticated communica-
tion. In current scientific discourse, this “complex” cog-
nition is set against the simpler modes that can be
observed in other species and are assumed to also have
characterized our nonhuman ancestors. Hence the
question that lies at the core of much paleoanthropo-
logical research: When, how, and why did humans ac-
quire language and so-called “modern” (i.e., like
present-day) cognition and behavior? Or, put another
way, when did humans become, well, “human”? In
PNAS, Niekus et al. (1) speak to these issues based on
their analysis of a 50,000-y-old flint flake dredged from
the postglacially submerged Rhine-Meuse Valley in
the North Sea off Holland. The flake is embedded in
birch bark tar and is of Neandertal make. It adds to
comparable finds showing that Neandertals used ar-
tificial adhesives to haft, or better handle, stone tools
across their entire geographic range and since at
least 200,000 y ago.
Neandertals were discovered in a time of wide-
spread acceptance that “race” and “intelligence”
were correlated and of descriptions of the “primi-
tives” encountered by colonial powers as living rep-
resentatives of the different stages of European
prehistory (2). The belief in a tight correspondence
between form and function even led to the rise of
the soon-to-be-discredited discipline of phrenology,
or the speculation that an individual’s psychological
attributes could be inferred from minute details of
external cranial shape. Unsurprisingly, thus, the chris-
tening of Homo neanderthalensis included this key
statement: “Psychical endowments of a lower grade
than those characterizing the Andamaner cannot be
conceived to exist: they stand next to brute benight-
edness. . . . Applying the above argument to the
Neanderthal skull, and considering . . . that it more
closely conforms to the brain-case of the Chimpan-
zee, . . . there seems no reason to believe otherwise
than that similar darkness characterized the being to
which the fossil belonged” (3).
This mindset has defined the stage ever since.
Its pervasiveness helps to understand why late
20th-century paleoanthropology so easily embraced
a corollary of recent African origin models of modern
human emergence—that behavioral and cognitive
modernity seamlessly followed from anatomical mo-
dernity. Within this framework, particulars of cranial
shape implied the Neandertals’ distinctiveness at the
species level and, since species are supposed to also
differ in behavior, the lack of anatomically modern
humans’ species-specific behavior (and underpin-
ning cognition). Thus, the demise of the Neandertals
and coeval, anatomically nonmodern humans was
self-explanatory: In a competitive exclusion scenario,
the cognitively superior species, Homo sapiens, in-
evitably prevailed (4). This view found support in the
claim that Neandertals did not engage in art or other
symbol-mediated behaviors; the jewelry found in
late Neandertal contexts was dismissed as reflecting
postdepositional intrusion from overlying, modern
human-related strata, and whether they buried their
dead or could master fire was also brought into
question.
Recent discoveries are overriding such views of
Neandertal cognition. Not only did Neandertals use
body ornaments, we also know now that they went
deep inside caves to build large ritual features and
indulge in speleothem and wall painting, all this
predating comparable behavior in Africa (5–7). In ad-
dition, reexcavation of La Chappelle-aux-Saints, the
site where, in 1908, the first Neandertal burial was
found, proved that the body of the deceased had
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been placed in a purposefully excavated pit (8), while strike-a-light
fire making using pyrite on flint has been documented in the
French Middle Paleolithic, some 50,000 y ago (9).
Niekus et al. (1) add to this rapidly growing corpus. Tar can be
accidentally produced when burning birch bark over an open fire;
small amounts will accumulate against the inclined surface of a
stone above. An innovative Neandertal could have been led to
deliberately recreate the conditions under which (s)he originally
observed the phenomenon and, eventually, start making tar at will.
Going from observation to production with this “condensation
method” might well have represented the technology’s starting
point. However, that method would have been insufficient to reg-
ularly produce the necessary amounts, and it is also inconsistent
with the chemical and textural properties of the archeological tars.
As Niekus et al. (1) argue, these properties imply use of the more
sophisticated “pit and vessel” and “raised structure” methods,
which imply the command of a set of chaînes ope´ratoires and,
crucially, being capable of controlling for how long the fire burns
so as to stop it before pyrolysis occurs and the tar combusts. Thus,
the spatial and temporal span over which these tar adhesives was
produced reflects the acquisition, mastering, and cultural, inter-
generational transmission of a complex production technology.
It is important to note, however, that, if technologically simpler,
the condensation method is nonetheless cognitively complex.
Indeed, rather than in the technological aspects of production per
se, the cognitive relevance of tar adhesives resides in the thinking
that goes from observing the accidental production of the raw
material to the inferences that 1) one might be able to reproduce
nature’s doings oneself, and 2) by doing so, one might be able to
obtain a significant improvement in the efficiency of one’s tools.
The following analogy highlights this key point. Technologically,
mobile phones are rather more complex than the telegraph, and
the telegraph itself is rather more complex than light signs emitted
through a chain of mountaintop fires. Cognitively, however, these
technologies stand for the same thing—minds that make arti-
facts capable of transmitting and receiving symbolically encoded
Fig. 1. Material culture as a basis for inferences about language and cognition. (A) Neolithic stone circle at Stonehenge, England. (B) Upper
Paleolithic tectiform sign from El Castillo Cave, Spain. (C) Middle Paleolithic stalagmite circle at Bruniquel Cave, France. Reprinted with
permission fromM. Soulier/Socie´te´ Spe´le´o-Arche´ologique de Caussade. (D) Middle Paleolithic scalariform sign from La Pasiega, Spain. If A and B,
which were made by anatomically modern people, imply language and cognitive capacities like those of present-day humans, so too shouldC and
D, which were made by Neandertal people.
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information, even at a significant distance, way beyond interindi-
vidual contact. Likewise, cognitively, no categorical distinction ex-
ists between the Paleolithic mind that makes a technologically
“simple” tar-hafted or tar-handled tool and the Industrial Agemind
that makes the archeologist’s technologically “complex” wood-
hafted steel trowel.
Thus, as Niekus et al. (1) point out, it is now clear that, when
submitted to evolutionary psychologists’ tests of complex, fully
modern cognition and behavior as can be inferred from material
culture and other properties of the archeological record, Nean-
dertals “tick the box” in all items. For instance, the large stalagmite-
made constructions that they built ∼175,000 y ago 300 m from the
entrance of Bruniquel Cave, in France (5), imply considerable social
coordination—like Stonehenge, if on a different scale, and, cogni-
tively speaking, conveying the exact same message. Ditto for the
geometric signs and the stencils of their own hands that Neander-
tals painted inside the caves of western Europe >65,000 y ago.
Cognitively speaking, those paintings are indistinguishable from
the comparable imagery left at someof the same sites, 300 centuries
later, by anatomically modern humans of the Upper Paleolithic—so
much so that, until their true age was revealed, archeologists
assumed that such geometric signs and hand stencils were of the
latter’s make. We are therefore called upon to apply to Neander-
tals the same chain of inference under which we do not even
bother to ask whether the people who built Stonehenge and
painted Lascaux were behaviorally and cognitively like “us,” or
whether they had language: Of course, they were; of course, they
had. Under the rules of logic, the burden of proof lies on the side of
anyone who would rather believe otherwise.
The picture of human evolution that this archeological evidence
redefines is one where the emergence of humans, “the symbolic
species,” is a closely integrated process of interaction between the
acquisition and transmission of culture and the biological transfor-
mation of the organism (10). While the former is cumulative and
bears the potential to grow rapidly and, once certain thresholds are
crossed, exponentially, the latter is a very slow and gradual Dar-
winian process. Thus, the magnitude of the transformations re-
quired to transform the brain of a chimp-like ancestor into our
language-enabled brain requires amounts of time way greater than
the couple hundred thousand years over which the Neandertal and
modern phenotypes were constituted. Instead of a rather recent
innovation, language, the fundamental machinery of human cog-
nition, must be the result of a process of coevolution that also
drove the growth and reorganization of the ancestral brain. Indeed,
if not for the requirements placed by language and its correlates,
our brains would be, by great ape standards, unnecessarily large
and, metabolically, too expensive—and would already have been
so 1.5 million years ago, in Homo erectus times.
Ultimately, the main lesson of the recent developments in the
archeology of the Neandertals is, perhaps, that we ought to
seriously reconsider the utility of framing the study of human
evolution in terms of species distinctions and other such dichoto-
mic, typological oppositions as simple versus complex or “archaic”
versus “modern.” One of the leading evolutionary biologists of
our time has very aptly represented the controversies arising from
such oppositions as a typical by-product of the “tyranny of the
discontinuous mind” (11): “zoologists always insist on classifying
a specimen as in one species or another. If a specimen is interme-
diate in actual form (as many are, in accordance with Darwinian
expectations), zoologists’ legalistic conventions still force them to
jump one way or the other. . . . [The] claim that there are no
intermediates has to be true by definition at the species level,
but it has no implications about the real world—only implica-
tions about zoologists’ naming conventions. . . . To look no fur-
ther than our own ancestry, the transition from Australopithecus
to Homo habilis to Homo erectus to ‘archaic Homo sapiens’ to
‘modern Homo sapiens’ is so smoothly gradual that fossil ex-
perts are continually squabbling about where to classify—how
to name—particular fossils.”
There is no question that Paleolithic humans were few and
much more scattered and morphologically diverse than we are
today. However, the archeological data, coupled with the ancient
DNA evidence for Middle Pleistocene intercontinental gene flow
and extensive Neandertal–modern admixture at the time of con-
tact (12–14), increasingly make it clear that the Linnaean cate-
gories of human paleontology are ill-suited to frame our story.
Irrespective of the boundaries that the tyranny of the discontin-
uous mind creates around such categories, what the Paleolithic
of both Africa and Eurasia reveals is the unfolding of humankind’s
gradual, culture- and language-mediated accumulation of knowl-
edge about the world and how to thrive in it. Eventually, this
process led to the development of a more complex technology,
of a body form adapted to a technology-dependent life, and of
sophisticated forms of sociality and communication requiring
material expressions amenable to archeological preservation.
As one might expect of any exponential process, the early stages
of symbolic material culture and complex technology are, like the
light reflected by a distant planet, dimmed by distance, in this
case temporal distance. In the Upper Paleolithic, the evidence,
more abundant and closer, has been apparent for quite some
time; thanks to the much better instruments currently available
to paleoanthropology, we can now also reach out to its earlier,
Middle Paleolithic beginnings.
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